“Financial alchemy” or a zero sum game? Real estate finance, securitisation and the UK property market by Lizieri, Colin & Ward, Charles
 
“Financial Alchemy” or a Zero Sum Game?  
Real Estate Finance, Securitisation and the UK Property Market 
 
Colin Lizieri (contact author) 
Professor of Real Estate Finance 
The University of Reading 
Land Management and Development 
c.m.lizieri@rdg.ac.uk 
 
Charles Ward 
Professor in Property Investment and Finance 
The University of Reading 
Land Management and Development 
c.w.r.ward@rdg.ac.uk 
 
Paper first presented to the World Congress of the International Real Estate Society, 
Girdwood, Alaska, July 27th 2001. All comments and suggestions gratefully received.  
Please check with authors for latest version before citing. 
 
Abstract: 
 
Following the US model, the UK has seen considerable innovation in the funding, finance and 
procurement of real estate in the last decade. In the growing CMBS market asset backed 
securitisations have included $2.25billion secured on the Broadgate office development and 
issues secured on Canary Wharf and the Trafford Centre regional mall. Major occupiers 
(retailer Sainsbury’s, retail bank Abbey National) have engaged in innovative sale & 
leaseback and outsourcing schemes. Strong claims are made concerning the benefits of such 
schemes – e.g. British Land were reported to have reduced their weighted cost of debt by 
150bp as a result of the Broadgate issue. The paper reports preliminary findings from a 
project funded by the Corporation of London and the RICS Research Foundation examining a 
number of innovative schemes to identify, within a formal finance framework, sources of 
added value and hidden costs. The analysis indicates that many of the gains claimed conceal 
costs – in terms of market value of debt or flexibility of management – while others result 
from unusual firm or market conditions (for example utilising the UK long lease and the 
unusual shape of the yield curve). Nonetheless, there are real gains resulting from the 
innovations, reflecting arbitrage and institutional constraints in the direct (private) real 
estate market.  
 
The research backing this paper was funded by the Corporation of London and the Research 
Foundation of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. The main project report and a 
shorter summary will be published by the Corporation of London in the near future. The 
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and should not be taken to 
represent the views of the Corporation or the RICS. We would like to acknowledge the 
assistance of the many people who have contributed advice and assistance on the project in 
London and in New York: and also the contribution of our Reading colleagues, notably 
Andrew Baum, Stephen Lee and Scarlett Palmer.  
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“Financial Alchemy” or a Zero Sum Game?  
Real Estate Finance, Securitisation and the UK Property Market 
Colin Lizieri and Charles Ward  
 
1. Introduction 
 
It has been suggested that the UK property market has lagged behind North America in 
adopting innovative analytic models and financial vehicles. In the property market boom in 
the mid to late 1980s, innovative development finance and funding techniques were adopted 
in UK property markets (in particular, to finance office development in central London). The 
subsequent property market slump and general recession led to retrenchment, with more 
traditional techniques and valuation models dominating the market. This has been seen as a 
constraint on developers, landlords and occupiers, particularly in the light of the demand for 
more flexible business practices and the intense competition between countries and cites for 
market share.  
 
Over the last few years there is growing evidence of more innovative approaches in property 
markets. Debt securitisation and asset-backed securitisation has become more common (the 
£1.5bn Broadgate securitisation providing one obvious, major example). The Private Finance 
Initiative has led to consideration of innovative funding techniques and new ways of 
procuring space and services. The domination of the long UK institutional lease has been 
eroded, while new forms of supply (for example, the rise of the serviced office sub-sector) 
and new forms of paying for space (the consideration of entry fees at Bluewater and turnover 
rents elsewhere as a complement or alternative to traditional retail rents) have evolved. 
There has been an active debate on the creation of securitised investment vehicles (despite 
Treasury reluctance to countenance tax transparency) and much interest in derivatives 
(notably swaps) and option pricing techniques.  
 
Nonetheless, as research by the University of Reading and others has demonstrated, there is 
much resistance to innovation within the property industry. Research on the valuation of 
serviced offices, for example, reveals that traditional valuation techniques remain dominant 
and that those techniques act as a constraint to supply. In particular, loan valuations, based 
on vacant possession value, discount the potential additional income from the business. 
Similarly, research strongly suggests that traditional valuation methodology understates the 
investment worth of shorter or non-standard leases when compared to simulation-based 
cashflows or option pricing models. Since asset valuation is fundamental to the development 
of active securitised debt and derivative markets, this presents a constraint to innovation. 
 
This paper presents findings drawn from a research project commissioned by the 
Corporation of London. The broad aim of the project was to analyse the potential for, and 
impact of, innovations in the financing, funding and procurement of property and to spread 
knowledge of innovative techniques to relevant parties with interests in the City of London.  
 
The research involved a literature search covering academic and professional publications; 
collection of material relating to specific schemes and projects; and a series of semi-
structured interviews with market participants in London and in New York. Those 
interviewed included staff from investment banks, rating agencies, corporations, 
institutional investors, property companies and property consultants and agents. These 
structured interviews were augmented by discussions with market participants. We were 
also able to draw upon unpublished research material from colleagues at the University of 
Reading and from the wider property research community.  
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In the research, we set out to review the types of schemes being undertaken, to assess their 
advantages and disadvantages and, in general, to provide a formal framework for evaluating 
new products. In particular, we sought to identify the sources of added value. What 
problems did the new product address? How successful were the new products at 
overcoming inflexibility and inefficiency in the market? Were there any hidden costs 
resulting from the new product? These questions shaped our analysis.   
 
In the next section, we examine the structure of the UK property market and the traditional 
model of financing and funding the supply of space. It will be suggested that the traditional 
system creates inflexibility, hampering the efficient supply of space appropriate to business 
needs and contributes to the pronounced cyclicality of the market. We then outline attempts 
to introduce flexibility and innovation into the market. While we focus on recent UK 
initiatives, we point to earlier deals that suggest that there are antecedents for the changes 
seen since the mid 1990s. Major claims have been made (particularly in the property press)  
about the advantages of the new schemes. In section three, we provide a framework that can 
be used to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of new initiatives. This framework is 
used in the fourth section to examine some of the new schemes. We suggest that some 
benefits are bought at the expense of costs and inflexibility elsewhere in the system; that 
some benefits result from a particular combination of market circumstances that is unlikely 
to be sustained in the future; but that some benefits result from the elimination of market 
inefficiencies and the closer integration of property and the other capital markets. Finally, we 
draw conclusions, pointing to possible extensions of the research. 
 
2. The Traditional and the New in the UK Market 
 
In the UK market, the finance, funding and procurement of real estate has been dominated 
by a set of dominant, traditional practices. While commercial practice does not conform 
completely to a single model, standardisation has been a striking feature of the UK prime 
commercial property market with institutional structures and appraisal practice tending to 
entrench a traditional format. As we will argue later, many of the innovative securitisation 
schemes actually rely and exploit the UK traditional model. 
 
Traditionally, property development companies have obtained short-term project finance 
from banks or institutions, then sort long-term funding in order to retain the building or sale 
to realise profits. The short-term funding came by way of a bullet loan. Until the 1980s, the 
term of the loan coincided with the length of the construction period. Thereafter, loans might 
run to the first rent review on the assumption that refinance or take-out might be easier at 
that point. In the second half of the 1980s, banks competed actively to provide capital for 
(often speculative) development and developers could obtain finance via tender panels, 
syndicated loans and multiple option facilities. This drove down interest rate margins. 
However, in the aftermath of the property crash, banks retrenched to  a more constrained 
and conservative approach. 
 
Generally, security has been based on both the company and the project (with both fixed and 
floating charges, post the 1968 Insolvency Act). In assessing security, banks have adopted a 
relatively conservative position, with valuation of property at vacant possession and 
consideration of the liquidation value of the firm (the “gone concern” rather than “going 
concern” basis). Following downturns, short-term finance has depended upon a forward 
commitment to purchase or a pre-let to a good covenant tenant. Allied to low loan to value 
ratios (outside “hot” lending markets), this has forced firms to sink their own equity into 
projects and/or seek expensive mezzanine funding.  
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To pay off short-term project borrowing, the completed development would either be sold 
or, if a long-term interest were to be retained, funding sought in the form of a mortgage or 
mortgage debenture. The traditional mortgage was f ixed rate with a long term. Margins 
were typically 175-225 bp over a comparable maturity government bond, with conservative 
loan to value ratios and positive interest rate covers. Debenture spreads over conventional 
gilts have varied more, exceeding 225bp in the immediate aftermath of the crash but falling 
to as little as 50bp in the mid 1990s.  
 
The conservative approach to lending reflects both uncertainty as to the validity of 
appraisals and the assessed risk of the sector (both in terms of risk weighting under capital 
adequacy regulations and the specific risk exposure that results from large lot size and the 
difficulty in diversifying loan portfolios1). This apparent caution in lending has not led to a 
stable flow of capital in real estate. At times of heightened competition between banks, 
prudent lending criteria have been abandoned fuelling speculative development booms; 
while in the downturn, excess caution has created a classic “credit crunch” with viable 
schemes unable to obtain finance and funding with consequent welfare losses. This, in part, 
results from segmentation of the real estate lending market from the capital markets in 
general. 
 
Property companies may also issue corporate debt or raise capital through equity IPOs or 
rights issues. In the former case, few companies are able to issue debt which would obtain 
high credit ratios2 . With regard to equity, the  traditional view has been that property 
investment companies are valued according to discounted net asset value. However, 
companies trade at a considerable discount to NAV, averaging 25% in the long-run 
(Barkham & Ward, 1999)3. In the late 1990s and into 2000 persistent deep discounts to NAV 
(in part due to the downgrading of value stocks in the dot.com mania, in part due to low 
market capitalisation and hence exclusion from tracker funds, in part to the adverse views of 
influential analysts) led to a rash of companies delisting, buying back stock or increasing 
their private element .  
 
These market characteristics are hardly exceptional. However, they need to be viewed in the 
context of the UK’s dominant lease contract, the so-called “institutional lease” with its long 
length (traditionally twenty five years), upward only rent review clauses, the repairing and 
insuring burden on the tenant (a “triple net” lease) and other onerous clauses. There have 
been many critiques of this lease form (see e.g. Crosby et al. 2000, 2001; Lizieri et al. 1997 for 
reviews).  A recent RICS survey found that only 8% of respondents thought that the UK 
leasing system was completely satisfactory against 27% who thought it unsatisfactory and 
undermined their organisation’s operational efficiency. From the perspective of this paper, 
the critical issue is the fact that the institutional lease evolved to support and sustain the 
traditional model of finance, and that appraisal practice entrenches its existence. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Loan syndication can help diversification and spread monitoring costs. There is, however, anecdotal 
evidence that syndication actually reduced risk analysis and due diligence in the 1980s as all 
participants sought to free ride on their partners. 
2 Even Land Securities, a long-term FTSE100 company, only had an A1 rating with Moody’s at the end 
of 1999, while S&P rated Capital Shopping Centres at BBB+ 
3 While there are many explanations for the discount, the net effect for property companies is akin to a 
loan to value ratio as applied by debt holders. 
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There is now a large body of research which shows that UK valuation practice has been to 
mark down values sharply wherever there is any deviation from institutional terms. This 
serves to stifle innovation and hampers the development of flexibility in leasing contracts. 
The valuation impact is clear in relation to funding and finance of investment property. 
However, corporate occupiers seeking to raise capital from real estate assets through sale 
and leaseback schemes or spin offs are similarly restricted to standard institutional terms, 
driven by the valuation process. Finally, standard appraisal techniques, predicated on 
comparative evidence from  similarly leased properties, are ill-suited to estimating the 
economic worth of differing cashflow patterns. 
 
This should create arbitrage opportunities. Historically, there is evidence of property 
investors exploiting mispriced asset classes – short leaseholds valued using dual rate, tax-
adjusted sinking fund methods or over-rented properties valued using term and reversion 
models, for example4. Two factors mitigate against this. The first is that, to gain abnormal 
profits, the new investor must hold the asset to the end of the lease or rely on the market 
“catching up”. This is problematic for investors since it restricts their ability to manage their 
assets and because their intermediate performance is measured based on the same valuations 
that created the arbitrage opportunity5. Second, the deal must satisfy due diligence 
procedures – and valuers advise buyer, seller and lender, helping to preserve existing price6. 
 
The property crash left an overhang of supply at the start of the 1990s which allowed tenants 
to obtain shorter and more varied leases.  As supply and demand moved back into balance, 
some of the tenant gains have been lost. Nevertheless, conventional leases are now more 
varied, and new forms of occupation and procurement have emerged.  The serviced office 
(executive suite / business centre) sector has expanded, and outsourcing total property 
requirements has become more common.  Investors and valuers increasingly use new and 
more sophisticated analytic tools to assess the potential of real estate projects. The trend 
towards internationalisation has continued, with the most large West End agents and 
advisors now part of global alliances.  At the same time, other business and financial services 
firms, notably management consultants and accountants, have captured a larger share of 
property market business.  These trends have reduced the isolation of property from the 
other capital markets. 
 
These trends have also helped to fuel innovation in funding, finance and investment.  The 
search for tax-efficient and liquid equity investments has continued, while securitisation of 
debt markets has grown considerably in importance, probably reaching a sufficient critical 
mass to be self-sustaining and drive down costs. This, in turn, has led to the development of 
asset backed securitisation. To an extent, the innovations of the last decade represent a 
continuation of developments in the 1980s that grew out of the liberalisation and 
deregulation of financial markets, with the aftermath of the property crash in the early 1990s 
marking a pause in a longer trend. Although the securitised real estate market is nothing like 
the scale and significance of that seen in the US, a  complete return to a reliance on the 
traditional model of funding and financing appears unlikely. 
                                                 
4 See Baum (1982), Crosby & Goodchild (1992). 
5 Formally, a Nash equilibrium holds in the market. 
6 Brown, amongst others, has questioned this, arguing that there are sufficient deals and sufficient information 
that such a process of valuer influence could not be sustained. However, the characteristics of property 
markets mean that no building is a perfect substitute and that markets are segmented. It was suggested to us in 
the course of the research that there had only been around eight deals of £200million or more in central 
London in the last four or five years, each with a very restricted pool of potential traders. In such thin markets, 
price anomalies can persist.  
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The CMBS market has developed slowly in the UK, by comparison to US growth. In part, 
this relates to size of market (and the difficulties of establishing a pan-European market), in 
part the less favourable market and regulatory environment. Conduits first appeared in the 
UK market in 1999. Lack of depth in the market means that margins are high, making it hard 
to devise profitable schemes in competition with cash-rich conventional lenders and 
mortgage-bond financing. By contrast, asset backed securitisation has developed rapidly. 
Three commercial deals have been highly instrumental in raising market awareness of 
securitisation: the Broadgate, Canary Wharf and Trafford Centre offerings.  
 
In 2000, Peel Group raised $900million secured on rental income from their 1.4million square 
feet regional mall.  64% was triple A rated – far in excess of Peel’s rating. Canary Wharf 
Group have made two major debt issues secured on the Docklands development. The most 
recent raised $685million (with an additional callable $325million). Senior notes have AAA 
ratings reflecting the covenant strength of the tenants. In 1999, British Land’s securitisation of 
rents from 13 London offices buildings (the bulk of the Broadgate complex) raising some 
$2.25billion. All Class A notes (51% of the issue) have a AAA rating (compared to British 
Land’s Baa / BBB rating). The properties acting as security are effectively ring-fenced from 
the rest of the company’s property portfolio in a series of subsidiary companies. The size of 
this high profile issue and the claimed benefits of securitisation contributed much to the 
growing acceptance of asset backed securitisation in the UK market.  
 
The size of the Canary Wharf and British Land Broadgate issues are symptomatic of the 
growth of the UK and European CMBS and asset-backed securitisation market. Moody’s 
Investors Services estimate that the total property-related bond issuance in Europe has risen 
from €2.7billion in 1998 to €8.5billion in 1999 and €10.7billion in 2000: they forecast that this 
will rise still further to €14billion in 2001. JP Morgan point to a similar trend with CMBS 
issuance averaging around $2.4bn between 1994 and 1998, climbing to $8.6billion in 1999 and 
over $10billion in 2000. While still small by comparison to the US market (issuance of over 
$50billion in 2000), the growth suggests that the market is becoming firmly established. 
 
Figure 1: Growth in European CMBS and Asset-Backed Securities Markets   
 
 
European CMBS Issuance: 
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For firms wishing to raise capital from their corporate real estate, a traditional alternative to 
structured lending has been sale and leaseback. Traditional sale and leaseback is off balance 
sheet7, the rent provides a tax shield and it may be possible to raise the full value of 
properties. Disadvantages include potential loss of capital allowances, partial loss of control 
of the assets, loss of any capital growth, loss of an asset that can be used to secure further 
borrowing and, possibly, uncertainty at the end of the lease term. Most of all, however, since 
traditional sale and leasebacks operated on traditional institutional style leases, the firm was 
exposed to risk from the rental market and faced upward only rent reviews.  
 
There have been recent attempts to create structures that are more flexible than the 
traditional model. In “Project Redwing”, J Sainsbury’s sold and leased back sixteen 
supermarkets to an offshore SPV accompanied by issue of $490million partially self-
amortizing secured bonds to raise the capital. Stores are leased back on 23 year leases, rents 
increasing by 1% per annum rather than being reviewed to market. Sainsbury’s  may 
substitute stores, subject to value and credit tests, providing some flexibility. At maturity, 
Sainsbury’s underwrites any shortfalls between market and  redemption values (a liability 
that, presumably, brings the transaction back on balance sheet) and have an option to 
repurchase the stores at market value or take a further 20 year lease. The bonds were initially 
rated A1 by Moody’s, but downgraded to A2 given the difficulties in the general retailing 
sector. Subsequently, Sainsbury’s conducted a second sale and leaseback transaction on 
similar terms, securitising the rents of ten stores to raise a further £232million.  
 
Other large deals include Shell’s sale of 180 freehold or long leasehold petrol stations to a 
joint venture between Rotch and London & Regional, both private property companies. The 
stations were leased back on long (18 year) leases with a five yearly rent review formula that 
took rents to the higher of market rent or 2.5% p.a. compound growth – a formula giving the 
purchasers a guaranteed real return over the short to medium term. The sale price was 
$435m which was debt funded on a 90% loan to value ratio reflecting the favourable rental 
terms and Shell’s covenant. Retail bank Abbey National’s sold its entire freehold and 
leasehold estate – 1,300 properties and some 604,000 square metres of space - to Mapeley, the 
Delancey Estates / Soros backed outsourcing vehicle for $670million. An unusual aspect of 
the deal is that the outsourcing included leasehold interests as well as freehold properties, 
raising complex valuation issues. Abbey National retain the right to repurchase some 
properties. Rents on the leased back properties will rise on a stepped basis, at 3% per annum. 
While this creates greater certainty and obviates the need for costly rent reviews, it seems a 
fairly high rate of growth. The Abbey National deal links to a growing trend for complete 
outsourcing of property functions, a trend developing from  government initiatives and now 
including private companies, utilities and corporations. 
  
Major claims are made concerning the benefits of such schemes for the borrower/issuer and 
for the investor: frequently, all parties are said to gain from the deal.  For British Land,  the 
overall interest rate cost of the Broadgate issue was assessed to be 6.1% which enabled them 
to reduce their weighted cost of debt from 8.9% to 7.4% (according to their own post-issue 
press release, although a figure of 7.05% was quoted later in the property press) while 
enabling them to borrow more capital at a higher LTV than conventional debt would permit, 
while investors gained property-exposure and high quality long-dated debt.  
                                                 
7 at least until the proposals to revise FRS12 and bring operating and financing leases into line are 
implemented 
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Sainsbury’s claimed that their sale and leaseback provided 100% capital at a cost of 7% 
compared to a 10% IRR on a conventional leaseback, with only minor loss of management 
flexibility while achieving greater certainty as to future liabilities.  Abbey National were 
claimed to have made a profit of $100million on the transaction, while obtaining flexibility in 
restructuring their corporate property portfolio. Inevitably, such claims arouse concerns: 
“there’s no such thing as a free lunch”. To evaluate the benefits, it is important to examine the 
rationale for the deal, the possible sources of added value and the way that value is 
apportioned amongst parties to the deal. In the next section, we seek to develop an 
evaluative framework to inform that appraisal. 
 
3. Value Creation and Hidden Costs? 
 
Considerable entrepreneurial effort is devoted to creating and adding value; one firm may 
take over another believing that the combined firm will be more valuable than the two 
separate entities. Similarly a real estate developer may assemble, through a series of discrete 
purchases, a site that can be yield additional value when developed as an entity. Within the 
area of appraisal, creation of marriage value reflects the recognition that by combining or 
recombining two assets, it may be possible to create a third asset that is more valuable than 
the sum of parts. In the history of capital market research, much effort has been expended on 
the search for robust methods of adding value to firms through innovative financial 
products. Research has often demonstrated the fallacies behind traditional arguments for 
some engineered solutions but has also shown how innovative techniques and products can 
contribute to corporate value. We therefore produce a brief typology of financial themes that 
can be perceived to add value for firms through operation of the financial markets.  
 
In uncovering the source of value-creativity in the financial markets, an enormous amount of 
research effort has been expended. There has been a mixture of methods, protocol analysis, 
experimental research and stock market price-based research. In both the US and UK, the 
overwhelming findings are that the capital markets are broadly efficient, in so far as it is 
extremely difficult to establish financial techniques that will deliver superior returns to 
shareholders. In other words, it is difficult to create added value. The work has involved the 
examination of publicly available information such as annual reports and accounts and less 
widely circulated information such as the information implied by directors’ share dealings, 
the price impact of company presentations to invited investment analysts, window dressing 
techniques in financial reporting and the dissemination of recommendations by brokers. 
 
Just as in every other market, entrepreneurs and innovators are able to earn extra profit by 
identifying a latent demand and quickly supplying products that will meet the demand. In 
the modern global economy, the window of opportunity in which innovators can exploit 
their foresight has become much shorter as competitors soon identify the innovators’ source 
of value and produce similar financial products. The financial sophistication embedded in 
many of the new financially engineered securities bears almost no comparison with the 
techniques and approaches used even a decade before. However, sophistication does not 
necessarily lead to added value and the discussion below highlights some of the ways in 
which the value added may not be as great as it appears at first sight. 
 
The analysis of debt finance has produced a large volume of research which has not yet 
satisfactorily resolved the issue of whether value is added to companies by structuring the 
debt/equity mix of their capital. Traditional finance identified that the contribution of debt 
finance could be found in its tax-shield but the extent and value of the tax shield has proved 
extremely difficult to establish.  
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In a financial world in which there are investors who are tax-exempt and other investors 
who have preferential tax positions in some debt vehicles, the financial advantage of debt 
from the tax viewpoint is likely to be limited. Some authors in real estate (e.g. Geltner & 
Miller, 2001) argue that the tax-shelter effect is neutral and most would agree that it is not a 
significant source of value. There may be a clientele effect since there are many investment 
institutions that seek investment assets which have long duration or maturities and are 
constrained from investing in equities or other more volatile securities but the creation of 
value in these cases rests in the appraisal of relative demand and supplies of each type of 
security and cannot be determined simply by supply-side analysis8.  
 
The continuing use of debt finance can also be ascribed to the signalling effect of debt. Since 
companies that issue debt have to cover the interest payments on debt in order to continue 
business, debt creates a hurdle that the management of companies have to overcome. 
Theoretical research argues that management will only create such hurdles if they are 
confident that their company’s future looks adequately secure. The corollary of this 
argument is that firms that do not issue debt (when they have assets that could provide 
adequate security for the debt) are likely to lack confidence in the future of their business. 
The empirical basis of these arguments is mixed but there is anecdotal agreement in the 
financial markets that ensuring that there is some debt in the capital structure is a signal that 
the managers of companies can make about positive future prospects of the business9. 
 
Leasing in the UK expanded rapidly over thirty years ago in response to a tax-arbitrage 
opportunity. Manufacturing companies sold assets to financial institutions who could claim 
tax allowances in the form of depreciation and capital allowances. In leasing back the assets, 
they acquired a tax shield. Clearly this is a real added value created by the tax system. 
However, from time to time, claims about the benefits of leasing have been circulated which 
are unsubstantiated or simply misleading. Two of the most common misconceptions include 
the idea that leasing provides 100% financing and that leasing provides off balance sheet 
financing.  
 
When a company rents a property, the amount of capital required to finance the transaction 
is obviously much less than the amount of capital required to buy the property. However, 
the two transactions are not comparable. In the first case, the rental payments are, in the 
short term, fixed, and at all times rank amongst the highest priorities for payment if the 
lessee becomes financially constrained. Thus the liability for rent is equivalent to the liability 
for a bond or loan taken out by the lessee. In financial terms, we argue that the rental 
payment is equivalent to borrowing or issuing a secured loan and, in fact, displaces the 
opportunity of debt. The owner of the property has, in addition to the rental scheme, the 
reversionary value at the end of the lease and an option to redevelop the property before the 
lease is complete. Both of these options become more valuable, the more variable are rents 
and yields in the property market 
 
Whilst recognising that the “lease as 100% financing” argument is  fallacious, advocates 
would still hold that leasing is preferable since it does not appear as a loan on the balance 
sheet. Thus it is believed that a company which usually rented property would appear to be 
safer than a company that bought the properties it occupied and issued debt secured on the 
properties.  
                                                 
8 Further discussion of the tax-related effects of debt can be found in Geltner, 1999, MacDonald, 1999. 
9 e.g. Chan & Kanatas (1985), Bester (1985, 1994) 
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There are two answers to this argument. First, it is almost inevitable given current concerns 
of the Accounting Standard Board and the International Accounting Standards agencies that 
companies will shortly be required to report operational leases in a more transparent form. 
Second, research into the issue suggests that investors already take into account the 
additional risk represented by companies entering into lease arrangements. Long established 
research (Beaver et al., 1970, Hamada, 1972) has determined that the more debt reported in 
the balance sheet, the higher the risk of equity. But is this true for debt not appearing 
explicitly in the balance sheet? Bowman (1980) looked at the effect of finance leases in the US 
before financial leases had to be reported. He found that the lease data was reflected in the 
equity risk of the firms. Dhaliwal (1986) similarly found that unfunded pension fund 
liabilities (which did not appear in the balance sheet although they were disclosed in the 
Annual Report) were reflected in the risk of equity. 
 
The risk attached to investing in the equity of a firm derives from two components; business 
risk and financial risk. For firms in the same industry which are broadly exposed to the same 
amount of business risk we can expect that the greater the gearing, the higher should be the 
equity risk. More specifically, Imhoff et al., (1993), Ely (1995), using US data and Gallery and 
Imhoff (1998) using Australian data, have looked at the effect of operating leases on the risk 
of equity. Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2000) analysed a sample of 161 UK companies 
and found that an improved estimate of equity risk resulted when the effect of operating 
leases was taken into account. This result implies that investors in the UK were aware of the 
underlying effect of operating leases. In turn, this implies that there is little or no benefit, 
even in the present regulatory regime, from the off-balance sheet argument for leasing 
 
Much of the innovative practice in financing owners and investors in real estate has been 
made by specialist financial institutions and investment banks. It is important to review how 
intermediation by financial institutions may create extra value in the financing process. 
There are three functions that underpin the value-creation: brokerage, transformation and 
risk management. 
 
The broker’s contribution to adding value to financial products stems from specialist 
knowledge. Given a market in which either party may participate at irregular intervals, the 
existence of a specialist broker will lower the transaction costs significantly because 
information about values and constraints will be readily available. The lack of publicly-
visible market transaction data, the consequential need for subjective valuations and the 
heterogeneity of the real-estate product are all factors that ensure the viability of the broker 
role. The thinness of the market for real-estate finance, and the lack of publicly-available data 
on transaction prices are factors than ensure that the brokerage function is an essential 
source of value when new financial products are being developed 
 
A common characteristic of financial institutions is to act as a maturity transformation 
mechanism. For much of the 20th century the yield on short-term securities was lower than 
the yield on longer-term securities. However this pattern was inverted in the 1990s and the 
inversion has persisted in 2000 and 2001. The implication of this is to encourage more 
companies to borrow on longer maturities than they would previously have been inclined to 
do, thereby enhancing the substitution of short-term bank debt by longer maturity 
securitised loans. Any tendency o f the shape of the yield curve to revert to its ‘normal’ shape 
may constrain the surge in securitised loan creation that relates to this maturity 
transformation.  
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Volume transformation can either replicate the work of a wholesaler, whereby the institution 
obtains a large financial position and distributes the security or asset between smaller 
companies, or a collection agency, through which small funds are aggregated to create a 
larger fund. In wholesaling, financial institutions can, because of their position acting as 
agents within or instead of a market, often act to make financial assets more attractive to 
investors by re-packaging them. The source of value in this operation should be found in 
reduction of transaction costs and search costs. As information about these markets has 
become more widely available, the gain from this operation should decline. The research 
evidence for the creation of value by this operation is at best weak. Professional companies 
and institutions do not unequivocally add value in allocating investment funds. 
 
The collection function is more obviously a creative force in financing since it substitutes for 
a market that is not yet operating efficiently. Over-the-counter securities can be seen as a 
special case of this function since financial institutions provide financing by issuing a 
security that can be sold to many investors. Instead of a market, the issuing institution 
establishes the security’s value by following a recognised procedure – validation by the use 
of its name, obtaining independently audit or accreditation (e.g. by rating) and ensuring 
some liquidity or an exit strategy for investors. There has been an enormous growth in the 
issue of securitised loans and other hybrid securities in the last decade: some of this growth 
is fuelled by a demand for products which could not  be issued in formal capital markets due 
to regulatory or legal constraints. Creating value through the collection function, usually 
requires substantial repackaging to maximise the financial value o f the original borrower. 
 
Overwhelmingly, demand in real estate financing is for assets with high ratings for safety 
and liquidity. Value is created by re-distributing and re-insuring the credit risk of the issue 
through operation in derivative markets. Valuation of properties predominantly reflects the 
risk attached to each property as a freestanding asset. Thus, risk in a short leasehold is 
perceived by valuers as being very high because of potential tenant default. This risk is 
reflected in the premium that investors require in order to be persuaded to invest in the short 
lease. However, if the short lease is part of a larger portfolio of similar properties, there is far 
greater predictability of income. The risk in the portfolio is much lower and the valuation of 
the income received from the whole portfolio should reflect this through a lower required 
return. In such cases, the portfolio value is higher than the sum of the valuations of each 
component. This principle underlies some of the more innovative asset-backed securities 
issued in recent years and clearly will continue to create financial value as long as valuation 
of the components reflects the total risk attached to single property interests.  
 
There will always be scope for exploiting untapped demand for new financial products. But  
successful products, stimulate competition and, eventually, competitors catch up and reduce 
the “economic rent” earned by the innovating company. In less efficient markets, where 
trading is thin and liquidity is poor, arbitrage opportunities may persist for long periods 
and, in fact, may never be resolved because of institutional constraints. Arbitrage action, for 
example, resulted in the recognition that the components of income from “over-rented” 
leases could be stripped out and repackaged to create bond and equity-type investments. 
There has been a surge in activity on the part of investment banks seeking to create further 
variations on repackaging that also exploits differences in yields between the property and 
the bond markets.  Once the emphasis in financing has changed to income rather than asset 
value, there is further scope for financing. Some of these methods of enhancement are 
sensitive to market sentiment and we are sceptical regarding the permanent establishment of 
higher levels of credit enhancement derived from expectations of deferred income or capital 
value. 
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Although it is argued that the financial markets are largely efficient in pricing and valuing 
assets, there have been specific instances  in which institutions and firms have introduced 
new products and achieved high profits. The real estate financing market has been 
characterised by some segmentation and separation from the other financial markets and  
financial institutions have been quick to move in and exploit anomalies and/or arbitrage 
opportunities. Finally the recognition of newer models of asset pricing have enabled more 
sophistication in creating new financial instruments. In discussing the sources of innovative 
value, we have noted some of the false claims that have been made. The potential sources of 
value gain – and the issues they raise – are summarised in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Added Value Through Innovative Real Estate Finance Schemes 
PRINCIPLE PROVISOS AND ISSUES 
 
Leasing 
Leasing => Transfer of tax capacity: Traditional justification for leasing. Applies 
only if lessor and lessee in different tax 
brackets. 
Leasing => Off balance sheet financing: Equity investors adjust for implicit gearing 
risk. Accounting rules may soon require 
balance sheet reporting. 
“Leasing provides 100% financing”: Increases implicit gearing so required return 
on equity will increase, reducing market 
capitalisation of firm. 
 
Debt 
Debt => Tax shelter derived from debt 
interest payments 
Depends on relative tax exposure of investors 
Debt = > Signalling effects of debt indicate a 
sharp management 
In adverse market conditions, may represent 
over-optimistic expectations of property 
entrepreneurs; downside risk magnified. 
Debt + ownership º lease + forward 
investment in property market (reversion): 
Exposure to property market investment is 
lost if property is leased. 
 
Securitisation 
 
Securitisation => Brokerage function creates 
value in thinly traded markets: 
Added value must be shared between issuer 
and broker. 
Securitisation => Maturity transformation: Added value must be shared between issuer 
and broker. 
Securitisation => Volume transformation. 
Property portfolio => Packaged as a loan: 
Possibly a relatively weak source of added 
value 
Securitisation => Risk transformation 
(through diversification gains): 
Must take advantage of non-portfolio based 
valuation in property market, 
requires/implies market inefficiency 
Securitised debt => Realisation of 
unsatisfied demand for (a) long term bonds; 
(b) property exposure, constrained by entry 
barriers: 
With present and projected shortage of 
government stock, securitised debt will be 
highly marketable; may not persist 
Securitised debt => Arbitrage between 
markets: 
Takes advantage of different yield structures 
in bond and property markets and relies on 
insensitivity of traditional valuation models 
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4. Alchemy? Evaluating the Claimed Benefits 
 
In this section, we seek to evaluate the benefits of some of the recent innovative products and 
transactions in the UK real estate market, to identify the sources of added value (if any) and 
to explore whether those sources are time-limited, specific to a particular company or set of 
market conditions or have a more general applicability. The starting position for our analysis 
is that, in an e fficient market, there will be little or no scope for adding value at no cost with 
only winners and no losers. We, thus, investigate how risk and return are reapportioned in a 
transaction. If it appears that both investors and the issuing company appear to gain 
absolutely, then we seek to identify the source of market inefficiency that the new product is 
correcting/exploiting. We would stress that we are concerned with particular types of 
product and transaction, rather than individual, named, transactions themselves. It is not our 
intention to criticise or cast doubt on particular deals which will have been carefully 
structured and analysed.  
 
We start our analysis with asset-backed securities such as those issued on behalf of British 
Land and Canary Wharf group. The discussion then extends to a consideration of further 
ways of repackaging income and to pooled or conduit based mortgage-backed securities. 
Finally, we consider innovative sale and leaseback schemes and other procurement models. 
 
The claim for asset-backed securities, secured on the rental income stream and capital values 
of a property company’s real estate portfolio, is that the firm can reduce the cost of its 
borrowing, since the bonds/notes are rated taking into account the covenant of the tenants. 
Since these may have a credit rating higher than that of the property company, the return 
required by investors is lower than with a bond secured on the assets alone. Investors are 
able to gain exposure to an asset that derives its risk-return characteristics from the property 
market at relatively low cost and receive a rate of interest that may be slightly above 
equivalent-rated corporate bonds. The process of securitisation means that no investor 
carries a high exposure to a single asset or borrower – which would not be the case for a 
conventional bank loan. Finally, the process of securitisation allows the property company to 
access investors and the capital markets that were previously unavailable. 
 
Some of these claims have a clear validity. The p rocess of securitisation permits the risk of 
the transaction to be spread amongst many investors; the relatively low cost of each security 
permits investors to hold the assets within a diversified portfolio. Investors who would have 
faced market entry barriers can now gain exposure to the property lending market (if they so 
desire!), leading to an integration across capital values. Since these investors do not require 
any premium to account for the large size of the loan, there may be downward pressure on 
interest rates in the less segmented market. The same argument would, of course, apply to a 
traditional bank lender securitising the loan – individually or as part of a pool. Securitisation 
is an option which reduces the required risk premium. The bank may be able to make profits 
through its brokerage/intermediation role, as is, of course, the case with the investment 
banks who arrange asset-backed securitisation deals.  
 
Other claims seem more debatable. One key argument is that the required coupon on the 
securities is lower since it is assessed on the credit rating of the tenants, not the property 
company. As a result, the proceeds of this cheaper debt are used to retire more expensive, 
unsecured debt, resulting in a fall in the weighted cost of debt. In the Broadgate 
securitisation, for example, it was reported that British Land reduced their overall cost of 
debt by 150 basis points. However, care needs to be taken in assessing such claims.  
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For the property company, existing debt – particularly fixed rate loans – has a set payment 
profile. Thus, an unsecured bond with a coupon rate of 12% requires interest payments of 
12% whatever changes are made to the underlying risk of the firm’s operations. However, in 
the secondary market, the price of the bonds will change depending on attitudes to the risk-
return profile of the company. The market value of the debt will thus change. It is the market 
value of the debt, added to the market value of the equity, that determines the value of the 
company. If a company’s debt is perceived as more risky, then bond prices will fall, 
effectively increasing the company’s cost of debt.  
 
This suggests a more cautious interpretation. Bonds that were secured on the company as a 
whole should have been assessed on the basis of the quality of the overall rental cashflow (to 
cover interest rates) and the value of the properties (as security in the event of default and for 
redemption at maturity). An asset-backed securitisation, in effect, ring-fences certain quality 
properties through first charge mortgages and subsidiary structures. This must diminish the 
quality of the remaining corporate cashflow unless and until the proceeds of the 
securitisation are used to acquire comparable quality assets. Thus, one might expect that the 
price of earlier debt instruments in the secondary market would fall, reducing the market 
value of the debt. This is a testable proposition. We note that British Land’s corporate debt 
was downgraded by the ratings agencies in 2000, although a direct link to the securitisation 
cannot be proven. 
 
Debts that are not traded on a secondary market – straight bank debt or multiple option 
facilities – are not subject to such price shifts (theoretically the asset value of the lender may 
shift downwards, but this may not be observable)10. The impact of the securitisation would 
be experienced when the firm needed refinancing. This would equally be true for refinancing 
of bonds, paper and debentures.  
 
The foregoing suggests that care should be taken in interpreting an apparent reduction in the 
cost of debt. It is feasible that the quality of the rental income and the security afforded by 
the assets in the securitisation had not been fully recognised by the market prior to the issue. 
The company’s added value (from the reduced cost of borrowing) would, thus, result from 
improved information and ease of monitoring. However, this would imply either that the 
valuation of the underlying properties did not reflect full information (a proposition that is 
important in arguments concerning repackaging of rental income streams) or that the market 
did not trust the valuations due to uncertainty and prior bad experience11. Overall, if the 
assets and operational practices of the company or group are unchanged, it is hard to find a 
case for a permanent and significant reduction in the overall cost of debt in the absence of 
persistent market inefficiencies.  
 
Another explanation for the reduced cost of borrowing is that the securitisation results in a 
change in the maturity of debt: that the issuance of bonds extends the maturity. If this is the 
case, then the success of the issue in reducing the weighted average cost of borrowing (and 
hence, increasing, the value of the firm) relies on two factors: the shape of the yield curve 
and the length and terms of UK leases.  
 
                                                 
10 There is research evidence that property market events do have an impact on the market capitalisation of 
banks, proportional to their exposure to the market. For example, the share prices of banks exposed to 
Olympia & York fell in response to its troubles; contagion effects then reduced the share prices of other banks 
with substantial property loan books (see Ghosh et al. (1994, 1997), Cole & Fenn (1996). 
11 This is a variant on Akerloff’s (1970) lemons argument.  
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As noted in the previous section, the current shape of the yield curve, with lower rates at the 
long end than the short, is unusual in historical context. In part, it relates to the lack of new 
UK government issues as the public deficit reduced, allied to the Pensions Act/Minimum 
Funding Requirement obligation on pension funds to match their long liabilities. The result 
is that, even though spreads are wider at longer maturities, the coupon rates on long-dated 
corporate bonds are, in relative terms, cheap. Thus asset-backed property securitisation 
offers, particularly where highly rated and backed by quality covenants, are likely to find a 
ready market. Even if there is a risk premium for property lending over comparable 
corporate bonds, the required rates will be less than those for conventional property 
borrowing.  
 
To achieve the high rated long maturities, UK issues make great play of the security 
provided by the institutional lease. The long length, the upward only rent review clause, the 
fact that rent is a prior claim on company assets, all provide greater security, encouraging 
AAA ratings for the senior classes. In a number of the issues, there are obligations placed on 
the issuer/property company to ensure that any relets or assignments are on similar, 
institutional terms (this is true of Broadgate and the Trafford Centre). Thus, in creating 
funding flexibility, the conditions may help to preserve inflexibility in the occupational 
market. From the opposite perspective, moves to introduce much more flexible occupational 
terms, shorter leases, break clauses and innovative rent fixing arrangements may mitigate 
against the success of future asset-backed securitisation.  
 
Two further points are worth noting. First, it has been argued that asset-backed securitisation 
enables a property company to raise more debt on assets due to more generous loan to value 
ratios. The overall impact on the firm needs to be considered here. The interest payments do 
represent a tax shield, but the greater proportion of debt should lead shareholders to 
demand higher returns on equity to compensate for the greater induced volatility. Overall, 
then, the impact on the market value of the firm may be broadly neutral. Second, the 
securitisation may place constraints on the operation of the firm. In particular, it may be 
difficult to dispose of those properties allocated as security or to change their use (most of 
the schemes studied included some substitution rights, but the particular nature of the 
properties acting as security would make this difficult to implement). The ability to 
overcome this induced inflexibility depends upon the prepayment clauses in the issue. The 
presence of Spens clauses12 or equivalent penalty terms can make early redemption 
extremely expensive. Given the pressure on property companies to reposition and respond 
to rapidly changing markets, this constraint on activity is a significant problem. Another 
consideration is that some of the asset-backed securitisations defer risk into the future but do 
not eliminate risk issues. 
 
One argument advocated for the value-added potential of securitisation is that the real estate 
market has failed to recognise the full investment worth of properties let on long leases. 
Asset-backed securitisation, in isolating one element of the income stream, exploits this 
mispricing. More generally, any such pricing inefficiencies could be exploited by 
repackaging the cashflows from an investment property, selling different elements to distinct 
groups of investors. This could be through the creation of income strips, swaps or through 
securitisation. Similar arrangements could be made to release the value of corporate real 
estate as part of an innovative sale and leaseback or outsourcing scheme.  
                                                 
12 A Spens clause forces an issuer, wishing to prepay a debt issue, to value the remaining cashflow at a very low 
discount rate, often the redemption yield on an equivalent maturity government gilt. See Catalano (2001) for 
examples.  
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The essence of such schemes is that the cashflow from a property can be viewed as having 
three distinct elements, the base rent or rent passing the rental income above the base rent 
which may arrive from the next rent and the residual capital value at the end of the lease. 
The argument is that, since these elements will attract different investors with different risk 
aversions, liabilities and expectations, the sum of the separate elements will be greater than 
the valuation of the whole property. Alternatively, it can be argued that the total amount of 
debt secured on the individual elements will be greater than could be raised on the whole 
property 13. The value added elements here derive from disintermediation.  
 
As with asset-backed securities, the potential for a market in stripped income in the form 
described above is dependent upon the preservation of the existing UK lease structure. Lease 
lengths must be sufficient to provide a long maturity for the vehicle, while the upward only 
rent review is needed to secure the bond-like quality of the base tranche. Further, if the 
market became widespread, it seems likely that the valuation of properties would adjust 
upwards to the sum of the separated elements to eliminate arbitrage profits. This suggests 
that the potential to profit from such schemes may be time limited. However, past experience 
of “misvaluation” suggests that there is considerable inertia in the property market (and the 
valuation process) such that opportunities may persist for some time.  
 
The capital market benefits of commercial mortgage-backed securities have been much 
discussed in the literature 14. For the originating lender, CMBS allow active management of 
their loan book, adjusting exposure to the overall sector or segments of the sector. This may 
be important in relation to regulatory frameworks (capital adequacy or solvency ratio 
requirements under the Basle Accord or national banking requirements) – a factor that has 
been important in mainland Europe, if less significant in the UK. The issuance of securities 
allows the originating bank to tap new sources of capital and reduces reliance on traditional 
sources - short term deposits. Finally, the mediation role may generate value in the form of a 
spread between the interest charged to borrowers and the coupon paid to investors. 
 
This spread, in turn, results from risk diversification, both from the securitisation process 
itself (spread of risk from one lender to many) and from diversification across loans when 
the mortgages are pooled or passed through a conduit vehicle. The originating bank could 
(should) diversify its own loan book, if course, but carries the whole risk of individual loans. 
Investors can gain access to a particular part of the market previously subject to entry 
barriers with low transaction and information costs (the monitoring role performed by the 
rating agency), can manage their portfolios actively and, at least in principle, benefit from 
liquidity in the secondary market.  
 
A number of market implications follow from the establishment of a broad and deep CMBS 
market. Capital flows into real estate should be more even than under the traditional system, 
due to the closer integration of capital markets, diversification effects and new sources of 
capital. This should prevent capital famines – during which viable projects and firms may be 
unable to borrow – but also limit over-lending due to monitoring by rating agencies and 
price signalling in the secondary market. In turn, this may help to reduce the amplitude of 
the property cycle – particularly allowing d evelopers to start schemes in market troughs, to 
arrive when demand recovers hence damping rental growth pressures. Evidence on interest 
rate effects from mortgage-backed securitisation is mixed. 
                                                 
13 It has been suggested that this is due to a failure to account for the option value implicit in the upward only 
rent review. 
14 Reviews can be found in Geltner & Miller (2001),  Fabozzi & Jacobs (1999). 
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The high profile Sainsbury’s and Abbey National innovative sale and lease back schemes 
discussed above are quite different in structure. However, a number of common points 
emerge from such schemes. As noted above, research suggests that leasing does not add 
value per se. Any added value must result from mispricing (in which case there are losers as 
well as winners), from information effects or from alignment of interests.  
 
In the Sainsbury’s deal, the firm was able to raise $490million (less $10million costs) from the 
sale which it could apply to operations. The rent appears explicitly as a cost in the accounts, 
allowing investors to assess returns relative to factor inputs. Furthermore, the indexed rents 
creates greater certainty in cashflow, although the residual position is uncertain with the firm 
having the option to repurchase (at some uncertain capital value), renew or dispose of the 
properties and the responsibility of meeting any redemption shortfalls (a responsibility that 
may bring the deal back on balance sheet). It is claimed that the cost to Sainsbury’s of raising 
the money is just over 7%, although the pure cashflow internal rate of return is closer to 
8.25%. In either case this is cheaper than conventional funding. The rental payments generate 
a tax shield effect and there is potential for a share of any capital gain. 
 
The cost for Sainsbury’s relates to the terms of the leaseback. Although there are substitution 
and redevelopment clauses, Sainsbury’s has committed to 23 year terms – necessary to 
provide the long maturity for the bonds to be marketable, to part-amortise the debt and to 
carry a low enough coupon to justify the deal. There has, thus, been an arms-length maturity 
transformation and constraints placed on the retailer’s activity. The indexed rent provides 
stability and certainty and, at a discount rate of 10% translates to an average growth rate of 
around 1.7% on a conventional lease with five year reviews. This is certainly lower than the 
average rental growth of supermarkets over the last ten years as measured by IPD.  Even 
with the constraints in the deal, the terms of project Redwing are much more favourable than 
those of a conventional sale and leaseback, with the typical tenancy being long and with 
upward only reviews to market rent. However, it does represent an increase in the effective 
indebtedness of the company, which should lead equity holders to demand higher returns. 
 
The Abbey National divestiture is quite different in structure. In transferring freehold and 
leasehold assets, the bank has sought to maximise its occupational flexibility, with rights to 
surrender properties, extend leases, buy back freeholds and with a much shorter average 
lease length. However, the deal appears to be very costly. It is hard to assess the overall cost 
of the leaseback, due to the assignment of lease responsibilities. The initial rent roll of 
$116million represents 17.5% of the $660million released. Equally, the 3% indexation of the 
rents is equivalent to nearly 4% per annum for a five yearly review cycle (again using a 10% 
discount rate). While this is close to the average for the second half of the 1990s, it is higher 
than the long run average, and at a time of low inflation represents high real growth. 
Nonetheless, Abbey National has raised capital from its corporate real estate portfolio, 
bought flexibility and made the cost of its real estate inputs explicit for shareholders 15.  
 
It thus seems that the amount raised via sale and leasebacks (and other outsourcing) and the 
cost of that capital is in inverse proportion to the amount of operational flexibility obtained. 
In particular, innovative sale and leasebacks that produce cheap capital tend to be 
accompanied by long term commitments – representing both a maturity shift and a 
constraint to operational flexibility. This must be considered in evaluating the benefits of 
such schemes. The (hidden) costs of constraints on active asset management and operational 
decision making should not be neglected. 
                                                 
15 That Abbey National was subject to takeover bids clearly had some influence on the deal. 
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US research on the impact of corporate real estate management on firm value suggests that 
moves to improve transparency result in increases in firm value16. In particular, evidence 
suggests that real estate sell offs are associated with increases in the market value of the firm. 
It is argued that the sell off provides true information about real estate values and property 
costs (much corporate property is held at historic cost). Evidence on sale and leaseback is less 
clear. Positive impacts identified include raising capital at a cost below that of a conventional 
sale and leaseback and at an amount greater than a conventional secured loan. Other gains 
relate to improved tax position. However, loss of corporate flexibility may offset any 
improvements in company value. By contrast, creation of a corporate real estate vehicle and 
spinning it off into a separate entity appears strongly associated with wealth gains for 
stockholders. It thus seems that moves that make the value of property and the impact of real 
estate management explicit provide valuable information to shareholders and signal an 
intention to maximise wealth. This information, together with any tax gain, is capitalised into 
share prices, increasing the value of the firm. 
 
The foregoing suggests that a number of the innovative schemes in the UK do not offer the 
unequivocal benefits claimed, not do they offer a long term panacea for the inflexibilities of 
the traditional market. This is not a criticism of any single scheme. Most have been 
imaginatively structured to meet the needs of particular clients and to exploit particular 
market conditions. Where the innovations exploit arbitrage opportunities and market 
inefficiencies, they contribute to greater market transparency, liquidity and efficiency and, in 
certain instances, can increase firm value and wealth.  However, value gains in one area may 
be offset by costs in another; flexibility in one area may be offset by induced inflexibility 
elsewhere. In assessing the benefits of particular vehicles and schemes, it is important that all 
the implications are traced through. This is particularly true of the tension between business 
demands for flexibility in the occupational market and the development of asset-backed 
securitisation which aims to extract full value from the proper assessment of the risk-return 
characteristics of different elements of rental cashflow. Many of the highly rated asset-backed 
securitisation structures are predicated on lengthy standardised leases and contain restrictive 
clauses preserving such arrangements.  
 
Schemes that rely on unusual market conditions may be “period pieces” with less long-term 
impact on market efficiency than those that address structural constraints – market 
segmentation, information asymmetry and entry barriers, for example. The current shape of 
the yield curve is unusual in historic context, a function of the lack o f long government fixed 
interest securities and the relative immaturity of many pension schemes. As pension schemes 
mature, and seek shorter dated bonds; if PSBR increases and is funded by longer dated 
issues, then the yield curve may return to its historic shape, increasing the cost of long-term 
money and threatening the rationale for asset-backed securitisation in the current format.  
 
 We have not explicitly treated tax issues in this paper. Nonetheless, these are very 
important: many schemes rely on tax efficiency to make value gains. This merits further 
research. We highlight two important aspects. First, tax and accounting rules vary 
considerably. This means, for example, that schemes that are of benefit in the US will not 
necessarily be successful in the UK. Second, in the current UK market, many schemes are 
driven by the tax status of the different players – in particular the tax-exempt institutional 
investors and corporations who seek tax shields to set against profits. The current position 
may be subject to review, particularly with the growth of tax-exempt private savings 
schemes. 
                                                 
16 Reviewed in Rodriguez & Sirmans (1996). 
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5. Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
Despite inertia, the UK real estate market has seen considerable innovation in finance, 
funding and procurement techniques over the last decade. In particular, the growth of CMBS 
markets, asset backed securitisation and innovative corporate real estate management have 
led to significant changes in market structure. These, along with the creation of new 
investment vehicles and new players, have helped to erode the dominance of the traditional 
finance-funding-procurement model.  Major claims have been made about the benefits of the 
innovations. These may have a validity for the particular scheme at the particular time in the 
market. Whether they have a more general validity is much more questionable. We argue 
that it is important to analyse the supposed benefits from a rigorous, theory-led perspective.  
 
In evaluating real estate innovations, it is important to remind investors that value is m ore 
difficult to create if markets are efficient and if investors are already aware of the sources of 
investment risk. We recognise some examples in which the entrepreneurial talent of 
investment bankers and institutional investors can exploit lacunæ in the markets. These 
included recognising latent demand for new financial products and spotting differences in 
the valuation of similar financial products in more than one market (market arbitrage). In the 
absence of a properly-functioning capital market, institutions can also exploit their position 
of knowledge by acting in a brokerage capacity, supplying a wholesaling function or 
transforming claims from one maturity to another. 
 
In securitisation of real estate assets, many of the new securities are based on the concept of 
ring fencing. This can enhance the investor credibility of the issue, but also can have 
secondary effects on the other securities issued by the company. Another factor that 
enhances the credibility of income backed securities in the UK is the very same institutional 
lease that is criticised as being inflexible and inequitable to tenants. UK issuers make great 
play of the security provided by the institutional lease and, in particular, the upward only 
rent review. One possible justification for this stance lies in the argument that the real estate 
market has failed to recognise the full investment worth of properties let on long leases and 
the option inherent in the rent review clause.  
 
Finally, we have reservations about financing schemes that are effectively trading along the 
yield curve. Since long term interest rates currently are below short term interest rates, one 
can arrive at apparent profitable schemes that in ‘normal’ times would simply not survive. 
Whilst one can applaud the entrepreneurial ability to spot and exploit yield curve reversals, 
such products are unlikely to be sustainable (in an economic sense). As a corollary of this 
claim, schemes that address structural constraints – market segmentation, information 
asymmetry and market entry barriers, for example, might well continue to be a feature of the 
expanding property finance market for the foreseeable future. These structural constraints 
represent a form of market inefficiency: innovative products thus help to create a more 
efficient real estate market that assists in efficient allocation of resources in the economy. 
 
This paper – and the underlying research project – is discursive in nature. A key future 
direction for the research is to test the propositions empirically at corporate level. This is a 
task that is made complex by the fact that many details of schemes and of company structure 
are private; by the difficulty of isolating the impact of an individual scheme from other 
changes in the market and the company. Many corporate bonds are warehoused, rarely 
traded and hence it is difficult to discern changes in the market value of debt. Nonetheless, 
we have some preliminary results (see Appendix A) and intend to develop the research in 
this direction in the future. 
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APPENDIX A: SOME PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Health warning! These are early results and considerable refinement will be necessary. 
 
If financial innovation has a positive effect on a company, this should be reflected in its 
equity prices. However, any change in the debt-equity ratio or equivalent impact on 
corporate structure should be reflected in the required return of equity holders. We set out to 
investigate this by examining the share prices of four UK companies involved in high profile 
real estate schemes – British Land, Canary Wharf Group, Peel and Sainsbury’s. In the event, 
Peel’s share prices proved too noisy to analyse. For the other three, we collected weekly 
share price returns, along with data on overall stock market returns and sector returns 
(property sector for British Land and Canary Wharf, retail sector for Sainsbury’s). We 
analyse these in a variant of an event study framework, using a single index framework. The 
results reported here use the sector index rather than the overall market index for two 
reasons. First, the analysis period coincides with the decoupling of value and 
growth/technology stocks which means that the overall explanatory power of the aggregate 
market index is low. Second, we are interested in isolating the company effects from overall 
sector movements. We tested the models using an aggregate market index and an 
orthogonalised sector index with no significant difference in outcome.  
 
The basic model tested was 
 
R it = a + bRSt + gRSt*D1t + fD2t + ut  
 
where R it is the excess return on the company, RSt is the sector excess return, D1 is a dummy 
for the period following the announcement of the scheme (such that the coefficient for 
RSt*D1t captures the change in equity risk after the announcement date) and D2 is an event 
dummy around the announcement date. Prior expectations are that if the scheme involves an 
increase in the indebtedness of the company, then equity investors will require a higher 
return and, hence, the g coefficient will be positive. The sign and magnitude of the 
f coefficient will depend on the (perceived) advantages of the scheme for the company’s 
value. We do not have a prior here, but do not expect f to be universally positive. 
 
In all three cases, the g coefficient was positive although only in the case of Sainsbury’s was 
the statistical significance satisfactory. British Land was ejected from the FTSE100 in 1998 
and continued to make announcements in the year following the Broadgate securitisation. 
Even controlling for the FTSE100 period, there may be too many changes to detect a 
Broadgate effect with clarity. Similarly, Canary Wharf Group only listed in June 1999, so the 
analysis period may be too short to establish stable betas. The company also announced a 
major new debt facility six months after the announcement of the securitisation in 2000. The 
f coefficient is zero for British Land, weakly negative for Canary Wharf and significantly 
negative for Sainsbury’s. 
 
These are preliminary, speculative results but the Sainsbury’s analysis (see Figure A1) 
provides strong support for the “no free lunch” hypothesis. Project Redwing effectively 
increased the company’s debt – which led equity holders to demand much higher returns – 
and was not viewed in a favourable light by investors, leading to a negative f coefficient. It 
may be that the loss of control implied in the sale and lease back or concerns about the 
management’s use of the new funds created uncertainty and adverse impacts.  Clearly, much 
more work is required on these analyses, but these early results are promising. 
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Figure A1: Preliminary Analysis of Sainsbury’s Returns and Project Redwing. 
 
Dependent Variable: J Sainsbury’s Weekly Excess Returns 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1/08/1990 6/25/2001 
Included observations: 599 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Constant -0.0009 0.0008 -1.079 0.281 
Sector Beta 1.0139 0.0382 26.555 0.000 
Post Announcement Excess Risk  0.5787 0.0708 8.170 0.000 
Announcement Window Dummy -0.0338 0.0159 -2.129 0.034 
R-squared 0.729     Mean dependent var. 0.0002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.727     S.D. dependent var. 0.0380 
S.E. of regression 0.020     Akaike info criterion -4.9901 
Sum squared residuals 0.235     Schwarz criterion -4.9614 
Log likelihood 1498.738     F-statistic 532.840 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.202     Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0000 
 
 
